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INTRODUCTION
They made the mistake of thinking of a personality as some sort of
possession, like a suit of clothes, which a person wears. But apart
from a personality what is there? Some bones and flesh. A
collection of legal statistics, perhaps, but surely no person. The
bones and flesh and legal statistics are the garments worn by the
personality, not the other way around.I

For centuries, society has been searching for the most economic and
effective way to care for its elderly. 2 Satisfactory and widespread elder
care has remained a constant challenge for society, from the time of
poorhouses to today's modem nursing homes. At the center of the
situation are a growing number of elderly and an unacceptable quality of
care, particularly in nursing homes.4 The population of adults aged sixtyfive and older is expected to almost double by 2030,5 and even though
many of the nation's baby boomers will maintain sufficient health to be
independent in the coming years, their sheer numbers will inevitably
exacerbate the health care problems present in our nation.6 That is not to
say that an effective and comprehensive health care system for the
elderly is infeasible. 7 On the contrary, a successful system of long-term
care is quite possible; however, it requires, among other things, the active
participation of older persons in their own care. Such "collaborative
1.
2.

ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 88 (1974).
See generally ABE BORTZ, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ACT (n.d.), http://www.ssa.gov/history/bortz.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
3. See generally ElderWeb, History of Long Term Care, http://elderweb.com/node/
2806 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). Although the first caretakers of the elderly were their
own families, the first attempts by society to care for elders whose families could not
support them, whether because of poverty or absence, were institutions such as
poorhouses and almshouses. See id.
4.

See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., RETOOLING FOR AN AGING AMERICA:

REBUILDING THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 11-12 (2008), available at http://books.nap.

edu/openbook.php?record id= 12089.
5. See id. at 1 (The number is expected to grow "from 37 million to over 70
million" by 2030.).
6. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that the models of care are outdated and the health care
workforce will lack the size and ability to care for the surging elder population).
7. See id. at 14 (explaining that the nation can act to avoid the upcoming crisis by
changing the way that elder care is administered); see also Cynthia Massie Mara, Focal
Points of Change, in HANDBOOK OF LONG-TERM CARE ADMIN. AND POL'Y 415, 422

(Cynthia Massie Mara & Laura Katz Olson eds., 2008) (concluding that change in
America's long-term care system requires a streamlining of policies, which should arise
from increased dialogue between health care administrators, legislators, and the public).
8.

See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 3, at 12. In addition to

active patient participation, the Institute of Medicine envisions that a successful elderly
care system will efficiently and comprehensively provide health care through
improvements in the way that services are organized, financed, and delivered. See id.
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care" emphasizes patient self-management through education and
treatment planning in contrast to the traditional provider-patient
relationship, which tends to emphasize only provider responsibility for a
patient's health.9 While collaborative care may be the preferable model
for the earliest stages of elderly care, the more incapacitated a patient
becomes by illness and old age, the more difficult it becomes for a
patient to self-manage.' 0 Nevertheless, a dependent resident may
actively participate in her own care by communicating the quality of her
care to her family and attorney. Such active patient participation among
nursing home residents, whether by the dependent patient herself or
another trusted coordinator, is integral to a successful elder care
system.1
In a recent decision, Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers Glen Hazel,12 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit added a
new tool to the proverbial toolbox of nursing home reform. The court's
holding may be utilized to help repair the quality of care for current state
nursing home residents and remind residents of both state and private
nursing homes that they are a class of beneficiaries with federal rights
that warrant protection.' 3 In Grammer, the Third Circuit held that
Congress intended the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments
("FNHRA")14 to confer individually enforceable rights upon residents of
county-run, Medicaid-participating nursing homes.' 5 Accordingly, the
Grammer court held that a resident may bring her claim against a county-

9. See id. at 243.
10. See id. ("Self-management is predicated on the assumption that patients have
both the ability to understand basic health care information . . . and the ability to use that
.").
knowledge to help manage their own care ...
11. See Megan E. McCutcheon & William J. McAuley, Long-Term Care Services,
Care Coordination, and the Continuum of Care, in HANDBOOK OF LONG-TERM CARE
ADMIN. AND POL'Y, supra note 7, at 173, 182 (identifying care coordination as a "key
component of long-term care").
12. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Ctrs. - Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1524 (2010).
13. See id. at 530 ("The plain purpose of these provisions is to protect rights
afforded to individuals."). In addition to reminding residents of their membership in the
class, Grammer's holding also should remind those involved in a dependent patient's
health care about her membership in the class, especially family members and attorneys.
The FNHRA also included
14. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396r (LexisNexis 2010).
amendments to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395i-3, which is the nursing facility section of the
Medicare statute. Because the Grammer court only considered § 1396r in its analysis of
the FNHRA, I will use § 1396r and FNHRA interchangeably.
15. See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 532; see also id. at 525 n.2 (explaining that the
absence of an explicit cause of action within § 1396r does not preclude the finding of an
equally enforceable implicit cause of action).
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run nursing home under 42 U.S.C. § 198316 for violating specific
provisions of the FNHRA while acting under color of state law."
Only a small percentage of Medicaid-certified nursing homes
("certified nursing homes") are owned and operated by state or county
governments ("state-run nursing homes").' 8 Most certified nursing
homes are owned and operated by for-profit enterprises or private nonprofit organizations ("privately-run nursing homes"). 19 Thus, the most
obvious beneficiaries of Grammer's holding, residents of state-run
nursing homes whose federally enforceable rights under § 1396r have
been violated, are fewer in number than similar residents of privately-run
nursing homes. For these latter residents, Grammer's holding has a
different meaning. Because the Third Circuit defined the class of
beneficiaries upon which Congress conferred rights under § 1396r as all
Medicaid recipients of Medicaid-participating nursing homes, residents
of privately-run nursing homes can cite Grammer as strongly persuasive
dicta when bringing claims against privately-run facilities.20 One cause
of action likely to be raised by such a plaintiff after Grammer is whether,
as a resident of a privately-run nursing home, she may sue the facility
under § 1983 for acting under color of state law. 2 1 Without a doubt, both
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
17. See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 532. Although the court did not explicitly state that
the defendant county-run nursing home operated under color of state law for the purposes
of § 1983, according to the attorney for the plaintiff, the parties stipulated to the
defendant being a state actor. See Email from Robert F. Daley, Attorney, Robert Peirce
& Assocs., to Edward J. Cyran, Associate Editor, The Penn State Law Review (Sept. 17,
2009, 22:26 EDT) (on file with author).
18. See CHARLENE HARRINGTON, HELEN CARRILLO & BRANDEE WOLESLAGLE
BLANK, NURSING FACILITIES, STAFFING, RESIDENTS AND FACILITY DEFICIENCIES, 2003
THROUGH 2008, at 20 (2009), available at http://pascenter.org/documents/OSCAR
complete_.2009.pdf.
The OSCAR database, fully known as the On-line Survey,
Certification and Reporting System, contains the annual data obtained from the state
surveys of certified nursing homes. See id. at 1.
19. See id. I include only Medicaid-certified, privately owned and operated nursing
homes under this appellation.
20. Plaintiff-residents of privately-run nursing homes can cite Grammer as
persuasive precedent in order to show that they are members of the class of beneficiaries
upon whom Congress conferred individual rights under § 1396r. Their rights may or may
not be enforceable. See discussion, infra Part III.
21. To establish a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that she was deprived of a
right under the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was
caused by a state actor. See Am. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
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privately-run nursing homes and their residents are interested in the
answer. This Comment will explore the question and conclude that
privately-run nursing homes likely do not act under color of state law in
the course of their operations, even though they must adhere to § 1396r
as Medicaid-certified facilities and they receive substantial state and
federal funding.
Without a claim of state action to enforce her newly-recognized
federal rights, a plaintiff-resident of a privately-run nursing home may
seek to enforce her rights through a private cause of action under
§ 1396r. This Comment will explore a private cause of action under
§ 1396r and conclude that, while Congress likely intended to include
residents of privately-run nursing homes in the protected class of
beneficiaries under the statute, there is not enough evidence to suggest
that Congress also intended to provide a private cause of action for these
residents.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of certified nursing
homes, including the rise of nursing home "chains" and the decline of
quality of care. This Comment will then analyze whether a § 1983 claim
may be brought by a hypothetical Grammer plaintiff against a privatelyrun nursing home and, alternatively, whether such a plaintiff has a
private cause of action under § 1396r. Finally, this Comment will
conclude that litigation is an important and necessary part of the future of
elder care in America; however, adding a new branch to § 1983
jurisprudence by finding a privately-run nursing home to be a state actor
is neither warranted nor necessary. Moreover, although a private cause
of action likely does not exist under § 1396r for residents of privately-run
nursing homes, plaintiffs likely would not employ such a cause of action.
Consequently, Grammer's legacy in elder care will be significant for
other reasons. For example, the Grammer case may solidify the potency
of certain state law claims.22 Regardless, the primary contribution of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22. Prior to Grammer, courts disagreed as to whether violations of § 1396r could be
considered negligence per se, but tended to agree on whether such violations could be
used as evidence of negligence. Compare McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 631
S.E.2d. 435, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that § 1396r appropriately establishes the
standard of care for a nursing home, whether under negligence per se or an ordinary
negligence action), and McCain v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 02-657,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12984, at *4-6 (holding that a plaintiff could maintain a cause of
action in negligence per se under the regulations), with Frantz v. HCR Manor Care, Inc.,
64 Pa. D. & C.4th 457, 469 (C.C.P. Schuylkill 2003) (granting demurrer on all
negligence per se claims but one because plaintiff-resident only had an implied right
under a certain regulation, yet suggesting that violations may be evidence of negligence),
and Goda v. White Cliff Leasing P'ship, 62 Pa. D. & C.4th 476, 481-85 (C.C.P. Mercer
2003) (also granting demurrer on all claims of negligence per se except one federal
regulation, but silent on whether violations were evidence of negligence).
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Grammer to elder care will be its role as a cynosure: reminding residents
of certified nursing homes that the federal government is concerned with
their protection and quality of life, and inspiring dependent nursing home
residents and their families to actively participate in elder care. It is truly
in this manner that Grammer and its progeny will be integral in forming
the solution to the rising challenges of long-term care in America.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Medicaidand Nursing Homes

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the
"Medicaid Act," promulgates the cooperative program between federal
and state23 governments known as "Medicaid."2 4 Medicaid is designed
to furnish medical assistance to low-income individuals aged sixty-five
or over, among others, through a combination of federal and state
funding.25 Each state is responsible for administering Medicaid to
qualified citizens and complying with the requirements of both the
Because Grammer held that § 1396r confers individual rights upon residents of
certified nursing homes that are enforceable in the presence of a remedy, future courts
will be more inclined to find that § 1396r and its corresponding regulations fulfill the
elements of a negligence per se claim. Nevertheless, because the ultimate decision is one
of state law, courts may divide along state lines. See Burney v. 4373 Houston, LLC, No.
5:05-cv-255, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34686, at *6-7 (noting "[elven though Plaintiffs
refer to a federal regulation as part of their negligence per se claim, it arises purely under
state law and does not present a federal question"). In addition to strengthening a
plaintiff-resident's claim of negligence per se, a resident's inclusion in the class of
beneficiaries under § 1396r may have an impact upon a resident's claims of third-party
beneficiary breach of contract, corporate negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
deceptive trade practices. Because all of these causes of actions are governed by state
law and may or may not include a standard of care, this Comment will not discuss the
impact of Grammer'sholding upon these claims.
23. In addition to fifty state programs, five U.S. Provinces and the District of
Columbia administer programs. See GAO, MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: FEDERAL
PROGRAMS TO PREVENT AND DETECT IMPROPER PAYMENTS, No. GAO-04-707, at 4 (July
I will refer to all
2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04707.pdf.
participating entities as states.
24. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2010); see also Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'1 Ctrs. Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman,
367 F.3d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Medicaid Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1396a-1396w-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
25. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (explaining that Federal grants to States under Medicaid
are to be distributed for "medical assistance to low-income persons who are age 65 or
over, blind, disabled, or members of families with dependent children or qualified
pregnant women or children"). A formula based on each state's per capita income
determines the amount of federal contribution to that state's Medicaid program. GAO,
MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: FEDERAL PROGRAMS TO PREVENT AND DETECT IMPROPER
PAYMENTS, supra note 23, at 4. The state is responsible for the remaining funds. Id. In
2004, federal contribution ranged from 50 to 77 cents per dollar spent on Medicaid. Id.
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Medicaid Act and its corresponding federal regulations.26 Medicare is a
separate federal program specifically designed to provide health
insurance to the elderly and disabled.27
In 1987, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987 ("OBRA"), which included the then-new Federal Nursing Home
Reform Act.28 Prior to this amendment of the Medicaid and Medicare
Acts, only two sanctions existed against nursing homes that failed to
comply with federal participation requirements. 2 9 First, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary") or state agencies could
terminate non-complying facilities from Medicaid and Medicare
participation, and second, where the noncompliance did not place
residents in immediate jeopardy, the Secretary or state agencies could
"deny payment for new admissions to the facilities for up to eleven
While preparing the FNHRA legislation, Congress found
months. ...
that states rarely imposed these sanctions, which resulted in many
"marginal or substandard" nursing homes that were "chronically out of
compliance" or frequently falling out of compliance. 31 Distressed with
the quality of care in the nation's nursing homes, Congress enacted the
FNHRA to provide legislation that would ensure a high quality of care
among those nursing homes participating in the Medicaid and Medicare
programs. 32 Some of the most notable provisions of the FNHRA include
replacing "conditions" and "standards" of participation for nursing
facilities with "requirements" 33 and requiring nursing facilities to care for
26.

See 42 C.F.R. § 430.0.

For specific state responsibilities, see 42 U.S.C.S.

§ 1396a.
27. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395c. The Medicare Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 13951395iii. Its corresponding federal regulations are located at 42 C.F.R. § 405. Medicare
and Medicaid have similar nursing home statutes and regulations. Compare 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1395i-3, and 42 C.F.R. § 405 (laying out Medicare's nursing home provisions), with
§ 1396r, and 42 C.F.R. § 430 (laying out Medicaid's nursing home provisions).
28. Although the Act was first abbreviated as FNHRA, this acronym now refers to
the Act in its later appellation, the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments. See
Grammer, 570 F.3d at 523 n.1.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I), at 466, 470-72 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-201, 2313-286, 2313-290 to 2313-291 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
30. Id. at 470-72. See also Grammer, 570 F.3d at 523.
31. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 470-72.
32. See id. at 452 ("[Congress] is deeply troubled that the Federal government,
through the Medicaid program, continues to pay nursing facilities for providing poor
quality care to vulnerable elderly and disabled beneficiaries."). The report also states:
In the view of the [Budget] Committee, all residents of nursing facilities should
receive high quality care, regardless of their source payment. Nursing care and
related medical services, in particular, must be at the highest level, whether a
resident is paying for his or her care, or is being assisted by family members, or
is entitled to Medicare or Medicaid benefits.
Id. at 458.
33. Id. at 453-54.
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their residents in a "manner and environment" that promotes the
residents' "quality of life." 3 4
An integral aspect of the FNHRA is its enforcement scheme,
designed to be managed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS") and administered by state agencies.3 5 Congress
outlined new powers for the Secretary and CMS. 36 The most notable is
that, regardless of whether or not a violation "immediately jeopardizes
the health or safety of residents," the Secretary or state agency may
terminate the facility from the program. In practice, however, it seems
that termination is not frequently imposed. According to the GAO, out
of 4,830 immediate sanctions for frequent and recurring harm to
residents between 2000-2002, 26 resulted in termination, and only one
resulted in a transfer of residents and closure of the facility.
Alternatively, the Secretary or state agencies may opt for other less
deterring penalties.39
In addition to enforcement regulations, the FNHRA outline survey
regulations and certification regulations. The Amendments require that
participating nursing homes pass a standard survey given once every
fifteen months on an undisclosed date by the state agency. 4 0 A grade of
"substandard care" results in an extended follow-up survey within two
weeks, and the survey must be given without prior notice.41 For a
nursing home to earn Medicaid or Medicare certification, attainment of
which is necessary to treat Medicaid or Medicare patients, the nursing
home must be licensed by state and local law and meet other federal
requirements. 42 The state agency charged with administration of the

34. Id. (also stating that nursing facilities are required to have a plan of care for each
resident that provides "services and activities" designed to "attain or maintain the
[resident's] highest possible physical and mental health, and psychosocial well-being").
35. See Marie-Therese Connolly, FederalLaw Enforcement in Long Term Care, 4 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 230, 239-43 (2002) (noting that "[CMS] administers the
Medicare program, oversees the states' implementation of the Medicaid program, and is
charged with ensuring that providers meet federal care standards").
36. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396r(h)(l)-(9) (LexisNexis 2010).
37. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396r(h)(1)(A)-(B).
38. See GAO, NURSING HOME QUALITY: PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE
DECLINING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCED OVERSIGHT, No. GAO-03-561, at 83
(July 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03561.pdf. A possible reason
for such low numbers is the "difficulty and undesirability of relocating residents" when
decertification financially forces facility closure. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 471.
39. Less intimidating sanctions include denial of payment for treatment of a specific
resident, fines for each day a facility is not in compliance, or appointment of temporary
management to oversee the return of the facility to compliance. See 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1396r(h)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 488.400 (2010).
40. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396r(g)(2).
41. See id.
42. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1, 483.75.
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Medicaid and Medicare programs is responsible for inspecting the
facilities for state licensing.43 Upon certification, a nursing facility may
begin receiving reimbursement for treating Medicaid and Medicare
44
patients.
Currently, there are approximately 16,500 certified nursing
facilities, of which state agencies surveyed 15,531 in 2008.45 These
facilities served more than 1,388,383 residents and had an average
occupancy rate of 84.22%.46 One of the most significant trends among
certified facilities over the last twenty years has been the increase of
ownership "chains." 47 Since the 1990s, for-profit nursing home chains
have been notorious for their low quality of care and inadequate staffing
levels.4 8
Because of their prevalence among nursing homes,
understanding the history and rise of chains is critical to understanding
the current state of care in nursing homes around the country. The next
section of this Comment will examine for-profit nursing home chains.
B.

For-ProfitNursing Homes and the Rise ofNursing Home "Chains"

Beginning in the 1950s, for-profit nursing homes became attractive
investments for entrepreneurs. 4 9 During that decade, Congress created a
government-supported market that included a vendor payment system,
which reimbursed states for direct payments to nursing homes and
increased accessibility to government-backed loans for nursing home
construction.50 At the time, the legislation was Congress' method of
increasing the supply of nursing home beds and shifting residents from
poorhouses and charitable homes to new facilities. 5 ' After the passage of
43. For Medicaid, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396g. For Medicare, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395i3(g)(1)(a).
44. See Brogdon ex rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327
(N.D. Ga. 2000).
45. See HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & WOLESLAGLE BLANK, supra note 18, at 8. All
16,500 facilities are not surveyed in a calendar year. Id.
46. See id. at 14. Since not all 16,500 certified facilities were surveyed, the
population of residents is understated. See id. at 8.
47. See Charlene Harrington, Long-Term Care Policy Issues, in PoL'Y AND POL. IN
NURSING AND HEALTH CARE (6th ed., forthcoming 2010).
48. See Trends in Nursing Home Ownership and Quality: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 11Oth Cong. (2008)
(statement of Charlene Harrington, Ph.D., Professor, Sociology and Nursing, Department
of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California).
49. See Catherine Hawes & Charles D. Phillips, The Changing Structure of the
Nursing Home Industry and the Impact of Ownership on Quality, Cost, and Access, in
FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 492, 495-96 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986).
50. See id. Before the Medicaid Act was passed in 1965, the vendor payment system
was part of another need-based federal grant system called "old age assistance." Id. at
494.
51. See id. at 494-96.

262

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1

the Medicare and Medicaid Acts in 1965, there became an even higher
need for nursing home beds, and Congress responded by increasing
reimbursement rates to include not only reported costs, but a proprietary
profit. 5 2 Additionally, Congress provided a lax standard of compliance
by requiring facilities only to substantially comply with Medicare health
The natural
and safety regulations in order to obtain certification.
response to these measures was an influx of new providers, increasing
the number of nursing home beds nationally from 460,000 in 1965 to
more than 1.1 million by 1973.54 Because nursing home owners received
full political, financial, and regulatory support, it was only a matter of
time before Wall Street became infatuated with the prospects of the
Soon, stock prices of the first nursing home "chains" rose
industry.
substantially.
Although the boom was short-lived, the nursing home chains had
only begun their reign. Overcoming changes in reimbursement and
regulatory policies, nursing home chains continued to prosper by relying
on the increasing demand for long-term care, reduced expenditures, and
the economic benefits of chain ownership.59
Chain ownership increased substantially in the 1990s behind the
idea that chain-owned nursing facilities were a more efficient way to
60
Specifically, the process of "chaining"
manage nursing home care.
nursing homes together was touted by management researchers as an
effective way to improve quality of care. 1 In 1991, 39% of nursing
62
homes were owned and operated by corporate chains.
By 2003,
52. See id. at 498.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 499.
56. A nursing home "chain" is generally defined as a "multi-facility organization"
consisting of two or more facilities. See HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & WOLESLAGLE
BLANK, supra note 18, at 22; Martin Kitchener et al., Shareholder Value and the
Performance of a Large Nursing Home Chain, 43 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1062, 1062
(2008).
57. See Hawes & Phillips, supra note 49, at 499.
58. See id. at 500. Contrary to expectations, the Medicare-supported extended-care
market failed to materialize, leaving companies seeking payment through Medicaid for
the costs of long-term care patients. See id. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid was much more
limited in its eligibility and reimbursement rates. See id.
59. See generally id. at 501-10.
60. See Charlene Harrington, Long-Term Care Policy Issues, in POL'Y AND POL. IN
NURSING AND HEALTH CARE, supra note 47.

61. See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1062 (explaining that quality was
expected to improve through standardization of services and the centralization of
knowledge among member facilities).
62. See Banazsak-Holl et. al, The Rise of Human Service Chains: Antecedents to
Acquisitions and Their Effects on the Quality of Care in US. Nursing Homes, 23
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION EcoN. 261, 266 (2002).
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approximately 52.6% of nursing homes were affiliated with corporate
chains.63 Primarily, this growth was not a result of new facility
construction.64 Rather, this "chaining," or assembly of facilities under
one corporation, arose from approximately 5,000 mergers and
acquisitions by the largest corporate chains between 1991 and 1997.65
Although most chains involve no more than ten nursing homes, the eight
largest chains operated 2,378 facilities containing almost 20% of all
nursing home beds in 2001 .66 In that same year, these eight companies
received anywhere from 61% to 82% of their revenue from federal and

state funds, and reported total operating revenue ranging between $1.3
billion and $3.1 billion.67
While it would be encouraging to report that large chains have
delivered on the promise of better quality of care through chain
ownership, the eight largest companies have not come close to meeting
that goal. First, significant criticism has been levied upon nursing home
chains for persistent quality problems and low staffing rates.
Researchers have pointed out that issues with quality and staffing are not
surprising because the economic advantages of acquiring nursing homes
encourage the practice of chaining while inherently decreasing the
quality of care.69 Second, some of these eight chains have run afoul of
the law. In 2001, one chain settled a $1.3 billion Medicaid and Medicare
fraud claim with the federal government. 70 That same year, the
government imposed an independent monitor, as well as criminal and
civil penalties, upon another chain for similar reasons. 7' Third, the
integrity of these companies has been called into question. In 2000, five
of the largest chains in the nation filed bankruptcy out of "necessity,"
citing the 1997 creation of the Medicare Prospective Payment System as
the culprit.7 2 Critics, including the U.S. Government Accountability
Office ("GAO"), have responded that poor and questionable business

63. See HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & WOLESLAGLE BLANK, supra note 18, at 22.
64. See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1065.
65. See id; see also Banazsak-Holl et. al, supra note 62, at 265 (explaining that the
data used for the study were the 1991-1997 OSCAR figures).
66. See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1065.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1066.
69. See Banazsak-Holl et al., supra note 62, at 262 (explaining that chains may be
more willing than independent homes to cut costs and inadequately reinvest profits into
facilities, staff, and innovation).
70. See Martin Kitchener & Charlene Harrington, The U.S. Long-Term Care Field:
A Dialectic Analysis of Institution Dynamics, 45 J. OF HEALTH AND Soc. BEHAVIOR

(EXTRA ISSUE) 87, 95 (2004).
71. See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1066.
72. See id.
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decisions were the true reason for the chains' financial problems.
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that chain ownership of
nursing homes can be beneficial to quality of care in some respects. For
example, acquisitions of poor-quality homes by large chains may
significantly improve quality of care after the transaction.74
Perhaps the most substantial danger to the quality of nursing home
care created by corporate chains is the focus on shareholder value. This
classic corporate objective can result in three particularly perilous
managerial practices for nursing home residents. 76 First, chains can
acquire and merge too rapidly, citing the glory of efficiency and the
Such mergers
potential to improve quality among member facilities.
in
the name of
Second,
and acquisitions often involve debt-financing.
cost minimization, chains can constrain expenditures on labor by
maintaining nurse staffing levels below state minimums, even in the face
of high turnover rates and state government sanctions for poor quality of
care. 79 Third, and perhaps most deleterious to quality of care, a chain
can treat regulatory sanctions as a normal cost of business, regardless of
whether those sanctions are imposed for jeopardizing the health and
safety of residents or for unscrupulous corporate governance.8 0 To
protect shareholder value, chains have taken steps to reduce liability
81
either implicitly or explicitly by placing emphasis on post-acute care,
exiting states with high rates of litigation, and establishing limited

73. See id. (reporting questionable managerial practices including rapid expansion,
large transactions with third parties, bankruptcy filings when facilities should have been
closed, and acquisitions of new facilities to convert Medicaid beds into higher-income
generating Medicare beds or to establish Real Estate Investment Trusts for lease to other
corporations).
74. See Banazsak-Holl et al., supra note 62, at 276 (explaining, however, that
"[h]ealth performance will suffer if the acquiring chain has a history of problems or if the
target home has previously achieved a high-quality level.").
75. See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1078.
76. See id. Although Martin Kitchener et al.'s case study completely focused on one
large corporate chain, Sun Healthcare, Inc., over a twelve year period from 1993-2005,
evidence of similar strategies among other large chains suggest that incentives are not
materially different among large chains. See id. at 1063, 1080.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., id. (explaining that although Sun's stock price increased from
speculation, Sun was engulfed in massive debt, encumbering the company amidst poor
quality performance).
79. See id. at 1078-79.
80. See id. at 1079 (also explaining that although many of the sanctions came before
Sun declared bankruptcy in 2000, "strong traces" of this policy persisted after restoration
of the company).
81. Shifting the focus of patient care from chronic care to post-acute care
(rehabilitative care relating to an acute condition, such as hip surgery) secures more
payments from Medicare, which historically pays higher reimbursement rates and
supports transient patients. See Hawes & Phillips, supra note 49, at 500, 504-05.
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liability companies. 82 Ultimately, the incentives of for-profit nursing
home ownership, quintessentially represented in large corporate chains,
lead to lower costs, greater accessibility, and higher efficiency than
nonprofit nursing home ownership, but also to lower quality of care.83
With nonprofit nursing home ownership, the converse is true.84 Notably,
nonprofit nursing homes seem to deliver care in a more honest manner
than for-profit nursing facilities85 and often serve as a testing ground for
new services and treatments otherwise unavailable to for-profit nursing
home residents.86
Furthermore, the seemingly beneficial market
elasticity of for-profit nursing homes tends to disturb the delivery of care
by incentivizing for-profit facilities to manipulate resident care when
benefit plans are disrupted.87 While it is likely best to have a
combination of both for-profit enterprise and nonprofit endeavors, it is
quite unclear what proportion of for-profit ownership is preferable. 8
What is clear are the perils of for-profit ownership to the quality of
nursing home care.
C.

The Need for Nursing Home Reform

Although part of the nursing home saga, a history of for-profit
enterprise and its incentives does not fully elucidate the state of the
industry. In 2008 alone, over 90% of nursing homes around the country
received 150,000 deficiencies.8 9 These deficiencies were given for
failing to meet federal quality standards for pressure ulcers, accidents,
infections, and unnecessary patient weight loss, among others. 90
Additionally, out of 65,000 complaints of poor quality of care to state

82.

See Martin Kitchener et al., supra note 56, at 1079-80.

83. See MARK SCHLESINGER & BRADFORD H. GRAY, WHY NONPROFITS MATTER IN
AMERICAN MEDICINE: A POLICY BRIEF 9-10 (Aspen Inst. 2005), available at

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Healthcare%20Brief.p
df.
84. See id. at 10-11.
85. See id. at 10 (explaining that because nonprofit health care providers are "less
likely to make misleading claims, less likely to have complaints lodged against them by
their patients, and less likely to treat less-empowered patients in a manner different from
other clientele," they appear to deliver more "trustworthy" health care than for-profit
nursing homes).
86. See id. (explaining that nonprofit nursing homes are able to offer services that
would be otherwise restrained by the standardization of payment systems in for-profit
nursing homes).
87. See id. at 11.
88.

See id at 15-17.

89.

Deficiencies are citations given to facilities for failing to meet a predetermined

standard of resident health or safety. See CHARLENE HARRINGTON, HELEN CARRILLO &
BRANDEE WOLESLAGLE BLANK, supra note 18, at 76.

90.

See id. at 76-86.

266

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1

regulatory authorities in 2008, 26% constituted serious deficiencies. 9' As
if these statistics were not alarming enough, the GAO reported that
between 2002 and 2007 approximately 70% of federal comparative
surveys performed by CMS identified state regulatory surveys that
missed at least one deficiency with "the potential for more than minimal
harm." 9 2 Furthermore, in forty-five different states, CMS discovered that
state surveyors missed over 40% of these lower-level deficiencies in
certified nursing homes.93 Additionally, nine states missed over 25% or
more of the serious deficiencies in nursing homes within their borders
and only seven states missed no serious deficiencies.9 4
The disgraceful conditions that these statistics elucidate confirm the
continuing struggle, on both the state and federal government levels, to
monitor the quality of care in nursing homes.
III. WHAT CAUSE OF ACTION Do RESIDENTS OF PRIVATELY-RUN
NURSING HOMES HAVE AGAINST THEIR FACILITIES UNDER § 1983
OR § 1396R?

A.

The Grammer Case and the Hypothetical Plaintiff

For the purposes of this Comment, the hypothetical plaintiff is quite
similar to the plaintiff in the Grammer case. The hypothetical plaintiff is
the estate of a decedent who claims that a privately-run nursing home
violated the decedent's § 1396r rights by actions that, in turn, caused her
death. The tort claims brought by the estate are wrongful death and
survival. The plaintiffs attorney would like to know whether the
plaintiff has a remedy under § 1983 for the violation of the plaintiffs
§ 1396r rights, or in the alternative, whether the plaintiff has a remedy
under § 1396r itself. This section of the Comment will seek to answer

91. See id. at 76. Serious deficiencies are defined as those that cause actual harm or
place nursing home residents in immediate jeopardy. See id.
92. GAO, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL MONITORING SURVEYS DEMONSTRATE
CONTINUED UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS AND CMS OVERSIGHT
WEAKNESSES, No. GAO-08-517, at 4 (May 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08517.pdf.
93. See id. The GAO further opines, "[Deficiencies that cause at least minimal
harm] are of concern because they could become more serious over time if nursing homes
are not required to take corrective actions." Id.
94. See GAO, supra note 92, at 4. The GAO also expressed concern that the number
of all deficiencies may be significantly understated due to poor aptitude among state
surveyors and weaknesses in the federal monitoring program itself. See id. at 4-5.
95. Over the last decade, the GAO, under both its current name and prior appellation
as the U.S. General Accounting Office, has investigated and documented the serious state
of the quality of care issues among Medicaid-certified nursing homes. To access these
reports, see the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
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whether the hypothetical plaintiff will succeed in bringing these claims
against a privately-run nursing home.
It is the task of the Judiciary to determine whether Congress
intended to create a private cause of action under a federal statute.96
Federal statutes may explicitly or implicitly authorize private causes of
action.97 To find a private cause of action, the court must first determine
whether Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of
beneficiaries.98 If the court finds affirmatively, then the court must
determine whether Congress intended to create a corresponding remedy
to enforce that right.99 In cases where the plaintiff claims that one of her
federal rights has been violated by a state actor, that right is
presumptively enforceable under § 1983.100 In other words, § 1983
serves as the remedy in those cases, without inquiry into Congress's
intent to create a remedy within the statute in question.'0 ' After the
presumption has been raised, the burden shifts to the defendant in the
matter, the state actor, to prove that Congress foreclosed private
enforcement of the right or rights either expressly, through intrinsic
evidence, or impliedly, through a comprehensive remedial scheme that is
"incompatible" with private enforcement under § 1983.102 If the plaintiff
is not suing a state actor, § 1983 is not available as a remedy, and the
court must determine whether Congress intended to confer a private
remedy under the statute.103
Prior to Grammer, a resident of a state-run nursing home who
wished to bring a tort claim against the facility for violating a provision
of § 1396r would be facing an uphill battle, not only because she lacked
a federally enforceable right, but also because state-run nursing homes
could claim immunity from state tort actions under their respective
states' laws.104 Now, after Grammer,'05 residents' 0 6 of state-run nursing
96. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)).
97. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Ctrs. - Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 525 n.2
(3d Cir. 2009).
98. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002).
99. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (explaining that "[w]ithout [a private
remedy], a cause of action does not exist").
100. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 285 n.4 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997);
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)).
103. See Sabree ex rel. Sabree, 367 F.3d 180, 188 n.17 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The
distinction between implied private rights of action and § 1983 private rights of action
rests not in the articulation of rights, but in the availability of a remedy."); see also
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698 n.21 (explaining that § 1983 is "certainly
not available" in a case involving a private defendant).
104. Although claims of governmental immunity by state-run and county-run nursing
home defendants are not always successful, they can be fatal to a plaintiffs claim and
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homes may avoid the assertion of governmental immunity defenses
against their tort claims and may enforce their own federal rights under
§ 1396r by utilizing § 1983 as a remedy.o0 As discussed above, § 1983
is only available as a remedy when suing a state actor for a violation of a
congressionally conferred right.'08
In this hypothetical case, the plaintiff is alleging violations of the
same § 1396r rights that the Third Circuit held were unambiguously
conferred upon the Grammer plaintiff. Because the only distinction
between the two plaintiffs is the ownership of their nursing homes, and
the hypothetical plaintiff fits the § 1396r class description,' 09 there is
every reason to suggest that a court would find that the hypothetical
plaintiff is a member of the class of beneficiaries upon which Congress
conferred individual rights under § 1396r. The sole opposing argument
would be that Grammer is not mandatory precedent because the
hypothetical defendant is not a state-run facility, which would arguably
foreclose § 1983 as a viable remedy and free the court from being
handcuffed to the Grammer holding. Indeed, the Grammer court's
involve further litigation. See Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 17-18 (Ohio
2007) (holding that Ohio's Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act abrogates
governmental immunity for county-run nursing homes, but recognizing a material
question of fact as to whether immunity still applied by an exception); see also Howlett
ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1990) (holding that governmental entities
subject to § 1983 cannot apply their sovereign immunity laws to avoid liability, but may
do so in cases not involving § 1983 remedies).
105. While the Third Circuit in Grammer was not the first court to hold that a staterun nursing home resident has an implied right of action under § 1396r and § 1983
against that nursing home, it was the first court to hold that residents of Medicaidcertified nursing homes who are not mentally-ill or mentally-retarded are among the
intended class of beneficiaries of the statute. For the first court to find a private cause of
action under § 1396r and § 1983, see Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003).
106. Neither the Grammer court nor the legislative history of the FNHRA clearly
establishes whether the protected class under § 1396r includes all residents of certified
nursing homes or simply Medicaid recipients. Compare Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l
Ctrs., 570 F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The provisions are obviously intended to
benefit Medicaid beneficiaries and nursing home residents. . . ."), with id. at 530 ("The
various provisions of the FNHRA at issue here place an unmistakable focus on the
benefitted class-Medicaid recipients who are residents of Medicaid participating
nursing homes." (internal quotation marks omitted)), and HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29,
at 452 ("The central purpose of these amendments is to improve the quality of care for
Medicaid-eligible nursing home residents, and either to bring substandard facilities into
compliance with Medicaid quality of care requirements or to exclude them from the
program."). However, it is clear that the intended class of beneficiaries consists of at
least Medicaid recipients of Medicaid-participating nursing homes.
107. A plaintiff suing a state actor need not prove that Congress intended to confer a
remedy under the statute in addition to conferring a right. See Grammer,570 F.3d at 525
n.2 (explaining that "§ 1983 itself provides the remedy"); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002) (explaining same).
108. See supra notes 101, 103 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 106.
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holding can only stand as mandatory precedent within the strictures of its
facts: wrongful death and survival claims brought against a county-run
nursing home under the theory that the nursing home violated the
plaintiff-decedent's § 1396r rights enforceable under § 1983.0
Nonetheless, the Grammer court held that the provisions of the FNHRA
conferred individual rights upon plaintiffs exactly like the hypothetical
plaintiff-residents of Medicaid-participating nursing homes who are
also Medicaid recipients."' Almost certainly, the part of Grammer's
holding regarding the qualities of the rights-bearing class would be
strongly persuasive to a deciding court, because the language in the
opinion does not rely on the nature of the defendant to determine class

membership.1 12
Assuming the court finds that the hypothetical plaintiff is a member
of the beneficial class, the next step in the legal analysis depends on the
plaintiff's claim. It is most advantageous for the hypothetical plaintiff to
argue first that the privately-run nursing home is a state actor under
§ 1983 because further analysis of a private remedy is unnecessary once
§ 1983 is invoked by the plaintiff.' 13 If unsuccessful in arguing that the
privately-run nursing home is a state actor, the plaintiff can fall back
upon the statute itself, i.e., whether Congress intended § 1396r to confer
a private remedy upon the hypothetical plaintiff. The former issue will
be examined in Part B below. The latter issue will be explored in Part C
below.
B.

The Viability of Utilizing § 1983 as a Remedy to Find an Implied
Cause ofAction against Privately-Run NursingHomes

Since the Grammer court held that § 1983 may be used as a remedy
14
to a plaintiff s private cause of action against a state-run nursing home,'
the court did not need to analyze whether the nursing home was a state
actor."' Thus, the Grammer case is neither mandatory precedent nor
useful precedent in determining whether a privately-run nursing home is
a state actor when treating a Medicaid resident. The issue of state action
is appropriately analyzed under its own doctrine.

See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 523-25.
Seeid.at530.
112. See supra note 106.
113. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (explaining that
"[p]laintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing an intent to create a
private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights
secured by federal statutes").
114. See supra text accompanying note 107.
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
110.
Ill.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that a claim upon which relief
may be granted under § 1983 requires two main elements.116 First, the
plaintiff must show that she has been deprived of a right protected by the
Constitution or Federal law. 117 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant deprived the plaintiff of that right by acting under color of
state law.118 As discussed in Part A above, the hypothetical plaintiff
likely can show a violation of a federal right, thereby fulfilling the first
element of the claim. The second element requires action "under color"
of state law, which the Court has recognized as akin to "state action"
under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.' 9 Over the years, the
Court has endeavored to separate acts of private entities that faithfully
can be considered state action from those that are necessarily private
action, in order to protect a State from liability for conduct it could not
control, yet impose liability when a State is "responsible" for the
infringement of a plaintiffs constitutional or federal rights.120 In
essence, the principal question in state action analysis has been phrased
by the Court as whether "there is such a close nexus between the State
and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."l 21 The Court has most recently
reiterated in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Associationl22 that the analysis of this standard is heavily factintensive. 123 The Brentwood Court employed several cases in an
example-based approach to its analysis. 12 4 The most factually similar

116. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978) (citing Adickes v.
S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) (recognizing
that conduct that is sufficient to meet the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment also fulfills the requirement of action under color of state law for § 1983
claims).
120. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295.
121. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The analysis of this standard has been generally referred to as
"state nexus analysis." See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State
Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HoUS. L. REv. 333,
391 (1997) [hereinafter Buchanan, Conceptual Historyl]. I will also refer to the doctrine
as state nexus analysis.
122. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
123. See id. at 295-96 (explaining that the criteria of what is "fairly attributable" is
not clear and a "host of facts" may apply to each analysis).
124. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 ("Amidst such variety, examples may be the
best teachers. . . ."). For an excellent walkthrough of the labyrinth of state action
jurisprudence, see Buchanan, Conceptual History I, supra note 121, and G. Sidney
Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
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case utilized by the Court, and indeed the most superficially similar
Supreme Court case in state action jurisprudence to the case of the
hypothetical plaintiff, is Blum v. Yaretsky.12 5 By understanding Blum and
its place in state action jurisprudence, the hypothetical plaintiff can
assess the strength of her case.
1.

Blum and the Story of the Totality Approach

Blum involved a class action suit brought by residents of privatelyrun nursing homes in the State of New York who received Medicaid
assistance under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a and its corresponding regulations.12 6
For a resident to receive Medicaid assistance, the federal regulations
required that the services provided by the nursing home be medically
necessary.12 7 In order to ensure that the provision of services were
medically necessary, the regulations required a proprietary utilization
review committee ("URC"), composed of physicians unassociated with
the facility, to determine periodically whether each resident was
receiving appropriate care or whether transfer to a different level of care
was warranted.12 8 When the URC recommended a reduction in the
plaintiffs' levels of care, it notified the state agency responsible for the
reimbursement of services.12 9 After state officials refused to reimburse
the nursing home for further treatment of the plaintiffs at the same level
of care, the plaintiffs filed suit, eventually arguing on appeal that the
State "affirmatively commands the summary discharge or transfer of
Medicaid patients" by nursing home physicians and administrators
through the operation of several federal and state regulations. 3 0
In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held firmly
against the plaintiffs' arguments. The majority focused its holding on the
ostensibly private decision-making of the nursing home physicians and
administrators.' 3 ' Despite federal regulations that threatened to exclude
nursing homes providing excess services from participation in Medicaid,
required state officials to review forms outlining each decision, and
authorized a fine for providers who violated applicable regulations, the
Court explained that the full power to decide whether an individual
patient would be discharged or transferred to a different level of care
Governmental Responsibility [PartII of ll], 34 Hous. L. REv. 665 (1997) [hereinafter
Buchanan, ConceptualHistory Il1.
125. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
126. See id at 994-95.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 995.
130. Id. at 995-96, 1005.
131. See id. at 1010.
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rested in the hands of the physicians and administrators of the nursing
homes. 13 2 In other words, the State was not "responsible for the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff [complained]." 3 The Court stressed that
discharge and transfer decisions were purely medical ones, uninfluenced
by the action of the state, and to which the state merely responded by
reducing or increasing Medicaid benefits in accordance with the nursing
home's direction. 13 4 To the majority of the Court, the State did not
exercise "coercive power" or provide "significant encouragement" to the
private actors sufficient to label the private action as state action.135
The dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice
Marshall, rebuked the majority's minimization and virtual disregard of
the specific regulations involved in the decision-making process.13 6 In a
detailed opinion involving a step-by-step analysis of the applicable
regulations, Justice Brennan proceeded to demonstrate how both the state
and federal regulations were designed to save money for the Medicaid
coffers by walking nursing home physicians and administrators through
the determination of a patient's ideal level of care.1 3 7 Justice Brennan
further explained that Congress created lower-cost Medicaid facilities
designed to provide "intermediate" care to patients unnecessarily being
treated with "skilled" care.13 Because the administration of state fiscal
policy was delegated to private actors, Justices Brennan and Marshall
argued that a patient-transfer decision by a nursing home simply could
not be made "independently of the state regulatory standards.... ,,139
Indeed, although patients could be transferred based upon a physician's
independent medical recommendation, patients also were transferred as
the result of URC reviews that involved a state-regulated grading and
reporting system, as well as final approval by a state board.14 0 To the

132. See id. at 1009-10.
133. See id. at 1004, 1005, 1008; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (citingBlum for the same standard).
134. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010.
135. See id. at 1004 (stating the standard), 1008 (expressing the Court's judgment).
Brentwood would later cite these factors from Blum as examples of an actionable nexus
between the State and a private actor. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
136. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1012-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1014-16.
139. Id. at 1028-29.
140. See id. at 1024-27 (detailing the process and lucidly noting that "if the initial
determinations were not made according to state-established standards and for the State's
purposes, and were in fact 'independent' medical decisions as characterized by the Court,
it is difficult to understand the State's active role in reviewing the substance of those
determinations").
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dissent, the State encouraged nursing homes enough to deem any private
action as state action.141
With one exception,14 2 the majority and dissenting opinions shift the
balance of their discussions to the plaintiffs' argument that the State was
a "joint participant" in the discharge and transfer of Medicaid patients.14 3
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs relied on the Court's state
action analysis in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority.144 Burton has
a special place in state action jurisprudence because it was the first case
where the Court considered the totality of the contacts between the
private actor and the State in its decision.145 In Burton, the Court held
that the action of a private restaurant located within a state-owned and
operated parking garage was state action when the restaurant refused to
serve an African-American while under a lease with the State.146 The
Court reasoned that the combination of the obligations and
responsibilities attributable to the State as lessor, the mutual benefits
arising from parking convenience and tax exemption, and the State's
alleged benefit from the discrimination created such a degree of
interdependence between the State and the private actor that the State
had to be recognized as a joint participant in the discrimination.147
The relationship between the State and the nursing homes in Blum is
more than comparable to the parking authority and restaurant in Burton.
The Blum plaintiffs argued that, through Medicaid and licensing, the
State ensured certain standards were met and effectively subsidized
nursing homes by paying the health care expenses of over 90% of their
residents.148 Indeed, even more than the parking authority in Burton that
simply provided maintenance and parking convenience for the
restaurant's patrons, the privately-run nursing homes were virtually

141. See id. at 1028.
142. Before addressing the "joint participant" question, the majority opinion considers
and discards the argument that the provision of nursing home care to the elderly is
"traditionally [within] the prerogative of the State." See id. at 1011-12 (majority
opinion). Although the dissent in Blum does not consider this issue, the Court in
Brentwood considers private action traditionally in the prerogative of the State to be
another important example of state action. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (listing an example of state action as
"when [a private actor] has been delegated a public function by the State"). For a further
analysis of this standard, see discussion, infra Part 1II.B.2.
143. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11, 1027-28.
144. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
145. See Buchanan, Conceptual History I, supra note 121, at 395, 397. See also
Burton, 365 U.S. at 724 (applying a totality approach to its analysis).
146. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-26.
147. See id. at 724-25.
148. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11.
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sustained by the government's funding.149 Moreover, unlike the Burton
customers, whose minds were likely blind to the state's involvement in
the discrimination at the restaurant, residents of the nursing homes were
quite aware of the role of Medicaid in supporting their lives at the
nursing homes, from paying for their food and shelter to regulating their
level of care.' 50 To the dissenting Justices in Blum, the degree of
interdependence between the State and the nursing home was "far more
pronounced" than the restaurant and state-run parking garage in
Burton. 5 1 While the nursing homes relied on the State for profits and
continued business, the State relied on the nursing homes to uphold the
regulations that were theoretically in place to improve the quality of
residents' lives.1 52
The majority quickly dismissed the issue. The Court reasoned that
heavily regulated private businesses could not be analyzed under Burton,
presumably because Burton did not involve a regulated business.1 3
Additionally, the Court denied that substantial funding was a persuasive
factor in determining the State's responsibility for the decisions of
private actors.154 By individually reviewing each factor and not
considering the totality of the situation, the Court matched the style of
reasoning in Blum 's sister opinion, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,'55 published
the same term. In that case, five teachers and a counselor at a private
school funded heavily by public sources and regulated by public
authorities were discharged over a disagreement with a school director.' 56
Like in the Blum opinion, the Court individually dismissed each factor,
including the fact that the private school, like the nursing homes, also

149. See id. at 1027 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The private nursing homes of the
Nation exist, and profit, at the sufferance of state and federal Medicaid and Medicare
agencies. The degree of interdependence between the State and the nursing home is far
more pronounced than it was between the State and the private entity in [Burton].").
150. See id. at 1027-28. There, Justice Brennan wrote:
Even more striking is the fact that the residents of those homes are, by
definition, utterly dependent on the State for their support and their placement.
For many, the totality of their social network is the nursing home community.
Within that environment, the nursing home operator is the immediate authority,
the provider of food, clothing, shelter, and health care, and, in every significant
respect, the functional equivalent of a State.
Id.
151. See id. at 1027.
152. See id. at 1027-28. Interestingly, the FNHRA solidified Justice Brennan's
idealistic view on the regulations as intending to provide residents with the highest
quality of life possible. See supra note 34.
153. See id. at 1011 (majority opinion) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974)).
154. Id.
155. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
156. Id. at 834.
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derived 90% of its funding from the State.' 57 The Rendell-Baker and
Blum opinions effectively put the totality approach to state nexus
analysis crafted in Burton into hibernation.158 Although the totality
approach would awaken in the early 1990s,' 59 the Brentwood Court
chose not to explicitly include the approach in its analysis, instead
adhering to its model of examples and applying the related concept of
"entwinement." 1 6 0 Nonetheless, the totality approach to analyzing the
contacts between the State and a private actor may still be invoked
today.16 ' Indeed, it only would require the appropriate facts. Does the
hypothetical plaintiff have the right case? If not, does Brentwood
suggest any other examples that may be appropriate?
2.

The Applicability of Blum, Burton, and Brentwood

The first examples of state action cited by the Brentwood Court that
may bear on a court's determination of the nexus between the State and
the private actor are whether the State has exercised coercive power over
the private actor and whether the State has significantly encouraged the
actor to commit the challenged activity.16 2 Both of these factors were
central to the arguments in Blum.163 The hypothetical plaintiff would
quickly point out that the relationship between privately-run nursing
homes, their respective states, and the federal government has grown
substantially since the time of the Blum opinion. If anything, after the
FNHRA were enacted in 1987, Congress increased the level of

157. See id. at 839-43.
158. See Buchanan, Conceptual History I, supra note 121, at 406 ("After the twin
decisions in Blum and Rendell-Baker, if the totality approach was not dead, it was at least
gasping for breath.").
159. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (using Edmonson 's reasoning to
hold that a discriminatory peremptory challenge by a defendant was state action);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (using Burton as
precedent to hold that a court enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge has
voluntarily used its state power to support a violation of the Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause).
160. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 297
(2001) ("These examples of public entwinement in the management and control of
ostensibly separate trusts or corporations foreshadow this case. . . ."). For a brief
discussion of the entwinement factor, see discussion, infra Part III.B.2.
161. See Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional
Liability; Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 365, 391 (2001) ("Justice Souter took the conception and test of
the state action doctrine decidedly back in the direction of the intuitive, ad hoc doctrine of
the pre-Rehnquist Vinson and Warren Courts.").
162. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
163. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-10 (1982). The disagreement
between the majority and dissent over the regulations centered on these two standards.
See discussion, supra Part III.B.1.
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regulation of the nursing home industry.' 64 Furthermore, states still
remain an integral part of the administration of Medicaid by contributing
part of the necessary funds, managing the reimbursement system, and
licensing facilities.165 Finally, similar to the nursing home in Blum and
the private school in Rendell-Baker, privately-run nursing homes
continue to be funded substantially through Medicaid and Medicare

reimbursement.16 6
Unfortunately for the hypothetical plaintiff, any argument advanced
under the factors of coercion or significant encouragement would be illfounded. Certainly, federal and state regulations are even more prevalent
among nursing homes now than before 1987, but neither the majority nor
dissent in Blum would find the regulations and private action involved
here to have the fingerprints of the State. Unlike the federal and state
regulations in Blum, which were designed to serve a state fiscal policy, 16 7
the state policy driving § 1396r is one of protection for the residents of
certified nursing homes.16 8 Essentially, the State, supporting regulations
under § 1396r through Medicaid funding, is advising nursing home
administrators of the rights that Medicaid recipients have.
The
hypothetical plaintiff might respond that the State is warning the nursing
home administrators what must be done and thus coercing, or at least
significantly encouraging, the nursing home operators to adhere to these
regulations. However, this argument is misled because it ignores the
action taken against the hypothetical plaintiff. When a nursing home
commits the negligent actions that would lead to the hypothetical
plaintiffs death, the nursing home is not acting in accordance with the
regulations. In fact, the nursing home is acting in complete opposition to
what the statute, regulations, and the inherent policy behind the
legislation explicitly require. No court could find that such illegal
activity was even in the most remote way coerced or significantly
encouraged by the State.
Alternatively, the hypothetical plaintiff could turn to the Burton
analysis for an appeal to the totality of the circumstances.' 6 9 Certainly, a
substantial relationship exists between the federal government, the State,
164.
165.
166.

See discussion, supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 25, 42-44 and accompanying text.
In 2008, the percentage of total certified nursing home residents primarily paid

for by Medicaid and Medicare was 77.65%. HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & WOLESLAGLE

BLANK, supra note 18, at 18-19. The remaining 22.35% of residents primarily were
supported by private funds. Id.
167. The majority agreed with the dissent that there was a driving state fiscal policy
behind the regulations. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008 n.14 ("We do not suggest
otherwise.").

168.
169.

See supra note 106.
See discussion, supra Part Ill.B.1.

2010]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER § 1396R

277

and privately-run nursing homes. 170 Under the Burton paradigm, the
important question is whether there is such a degree of interdependence
between the State and the private actor as to consider the State a joint
participant in the challenged action. 171 The hypothetical plaintiff could
make a strong argument by relying on the same reasoning as the dissent
in Blum.
The dissent in Blum reasoned that the relationship between the State
and nursing homes was even more interdependent than the relationship
between the State and restaurant in Burton because of the great level of
state-funding and the pervasive state regulation of nursing home
administration. 172 Certainly, the relationship between privately-run
nursing homes and the State continues to involve heavy regulation,
licensing, and substantial funding.173 Although the primary source of
funding for residents of privately-run nursing homes is less than 90%
Medicaid and Medicare, as it was at the time of Blum, the current rate is
still arguably a substantial amount. 174 Additionally, federal and state
regulations continue to dominate the daily lives of nursing home
residents, at least as much as they did at the time of the Blum decision.175
Certainly, it is the position of this Comment that Grammer will transform
the federal regulations from inconspicuously care-propelling standards to
health care reforming rights, through active participation of residents in
their own care. However, that is not to say that the regulations have not
dominated the operation of nursing homes until the present and will not
continue to do so in the future. 17 On the contrary, increased regulation
and the double-check system of surveys between CMS, states, and
nursing homes likely results in the pervasive influence of regulation upon
daily life. 17 7 Finally, in 1987, Congress solidified its intent that § 1396r
and the FNHRA provide the highest quality of life and care possible for
residents.17 8 With the intent of the State to control nursing home actions
through pervasive regulations, the continued support of the industry
170. See discussion, supra Part II.A.
171. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
173. See discussion, supra Part II.A.
174. See supra note 166 (The current percentage of residents whose primary source of
payment is Medicaid or Medicare is 77.65%.).
175. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. As discussed, the FNHRA
legislation only added more regulations and government oversight. See discussion supra
Part II.A.
176. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1028 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No
one would doubt that nursing homes are pervasively regulated by State and Federal
Governments; virtually every action by the operator is subject to state oversight."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
177. See discussion, supra Part II.C.
178. See supra note 34.
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through Medicaid and Medicare funding, and the seeming dependency of
the residents upon the State through the hands of the nursing homes, the
situation is exactly what Justice Brennan warned about in his dissent in
Blum: "Surely, in this context we must be especially alert to those
situations in which the State 'has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind' the actions of the nursing home owner,"l 79 for "when the
State directs, supports, and encourages [private institutions with whom
the State has chosen to achieve a policy] to take specific action, that
action is state action." 80 The dissent was applying the totality approach
from Burton to a new fact pattern with persuasive reasoning. So, too, the
hypothetical plaintiff can develop her strongest § 1983 argument by
appealing to the entire relationship between the State and nursing homes.
However, there are two fatal blows to the hypothetical plaintiffs
position. First, as discussed above, Blum is distinguishable from the
hypothetical plaintiffs case because, in Blum, the federal and state
regulations guided the nursing home's discharge and transfer
decisions.' 8 1 In the hypothetical plaintiffs case, the regulations establish
resident rights, or in other words, serve as a warning to nursing homes
that they violate their residents' rights at their own peril. Second,
although the Burton totality approach was treated positively in two
Supreme Court cases in the early 1990s,18 2 other Court cases have cast
doubt upon its scope.183 Indeed, most applicable to the hypothetical
plaintiffs case, the majority opinions in Blum and Rendell-Baker fully
Nonetheless, if the
discarded the Burton totality approach.184
the hesitation of a
approach,
the
to
apply
hypothetical plaintiff sought
recent Third Circuit case to expand the scope of the test should deter her
from arguing further.18 '

179.

Blum, 457 U.S. at 1028 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.

715, 725 (1961)).

180. Id.
181. See id. at 1008, 1026-27.
182. See supra note 159.
183. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57-58 (1999)
(emphasizing the following quote from Blum: "privately owned enterprises providing
services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they are extensively
regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Burton."); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
192 (1988) (limiting Burton's scope to cases where the State "knowingly accepts the
benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior"); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (explaining that the scope of Burton is limited to lessees of public
property).
184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
185. See Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm't, Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 239-46 (3d Cir.
2002).
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In Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment, Inc., 186 casino
employees excluded the plaintiffs from the casino premises for two
years.187 Charged with determining whether there was a sufficiently
interdependent relationship between a Delaware casino and the State of
Delaware under Burton, the Third Circuit held that, regardless of the
heavy regulation and substantial flow of funds from casino to State, there
was no state action because the State did not directly benefit from the
exclusion of the plaintiffs from the casino nor did a state official make
the decision." The facts of Crissman more clearly define the scope of
Burton. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall would balk at such an
exiguous interpretation of the totality approach, it is likely best to keep
Burton 's scope narrow. Ultimately, as Justice Souter, writing for the
majority in Brentwood, explained, "[no] set of circumstances [is]
absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason
against attributing activity to the government."l 89 Thus, a court likely
would not find the hypothetical plaintiffs use of the totality approach to
be compelling.
The Brentwood opinion cites several other axioms of state action
jurisprudence, none of which have significant application to the
hypothetical plaintiffs case. Privately-run nursing homes that violate
rights under § 1396r certainly do not "willful[ly] participa[te] in joint
activity with the State or its agents," 90 because neither the State nor its
agents are involved with the nursing home's violations. Similarly, even
if a privately-run nursing home can be considered a "nominally private
actor," in no way are the staff members or administrators of nursing
homes "controlled by an agency of the State" when they violate
§ 1396r.19'
A more involved question may arise regarding whether the
privately-run nursing homes have been "delegated a public function by
the State."1 9 2 In state action jurisprudence, the question of public
function has also been phrased as whether the private actor performs a
function that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." 93

186. Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm't, Inc., 289 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2002).
187. See id. at 234-35.
188. See id. at 243-45; see also id. at 244 n.17 (listing five circuit decisions that held
similarly).
189. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96
(2001).
190. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982)).
191. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (per curiam)).
192. Id.
193. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982).
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As was briefly mentioned, the Blum court had occasion to consider
whether nursing home care has traditionally and exclusively been
provided by the State and decided negatively.194
Finding no
constitutional or statutory authority requiring the State to provide nursing
services to the elderly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument.'
Similarly, in the case of the hypothetical plaintiff, there is no
constitutional or statutory authority that directs the State to provide elder
care services. Additionally, further analysis can become meticulous.19 6
Regardless, the hypothetical plaintiff simply does not have a nonfrivolous argument because elder care has never been the exclusive
responsibility of the State.' 97
Finally, the Brentwood case presents one other axiom of state action
jurisprudence, "entwinement."l 9 8 The Court explains that a nominally
private actor is a state actor when "it is entwined with governmental
policies or when government is entwined in its management or
control." 99
In Brentwood, an interscholastic athletic association
consisting of public school officials and State School Board members
suspended a member school's athletic program in accordance with an
Association rule prohibiting undue influence in athletic recruitment.20 0
The member school sued the Association claiming that enforcement of
the rule was state action under § 1983 and violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20 1 The Supreme Court held that the Association was a state
actor because it was entwined both "up" from public school officials and
"down" from State School Board members by their capacities as officers
of the Association.202 The Court found that the entwinement was so

194. See supranote 142.
195. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011-12.
196. Even if there is statutory authority or ambiguous constitutional authority, a court
still may not agree that the standard is met. See id. ("[Even if the State had such
authority] it would not follow that decisions made in the day-to-day administration of a
nursing home are the kind of decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the
sovereign for and on behalf of the public."); see also Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337,
341-47 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that foster care, although a traditional public duty, has
never been an exclusive public function, and therefore foster parents are not state actors);
cf West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a prison physician was a state
actor when treating a prisoner because, inherently in the Eighth Amendment and state
law, it has been the traditional and exclusive prerogative of the State to provide medical
care for inmates).
197. See supra note 3.
198. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
199. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299,
301 (1966)).
200. See id. at 290-94.
201. Id. at 293.
202. Id. at 300-01.
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"pervasive" that it rose to the point of "largely overlapping identity"
between the Association and the State.20 3
Unfortunately for the hypothetical plaintiff, in her case, the same
character of entwinement is impossible. Even if a court were to accept
that the federal and state Medicaid regulatory scheme was so pervasive
that it provided the necessary entwinement from the "top down," there is
absolutely no "bottom up" entwinement from any privately-run nursing
home administrators.
No such administrators or staff could be
considered public officials due to the private nature of the facilities. To
be sure, as nursing homes aggregate into chains, it may be possible that
state Medicaid officials could sit on Boards of Directors of such chains
or Directors may hold state positions, but such a possibility is quite
remote. Even so, the necessary entwinement would require many of
such individuals sitting in conflicts of interest to reach the high threshold
of the Association in Brentwood. The hypothetical plaintiff will not be
able to obtain a default remedy under § 1983 for her rights under
§ 1396r. However, there still might be a remedy under the statute itself.
C.

Do Residents ofPrivately-Run Nursing Homes Have a Private
Cause ofAction under § 1396r?

Without a remedy under § 1983 for violations of her rights under
§ 1396r, the hypothetical plaintiff now turns to the statute itself for a
remedy. Her executor may be surprised to know that a class of plaintiffs
very similar to the decedent raised the same question in a federal district
court in Georgia in 2000204 and an executor for an individual plaintiff
sued for the same issue in a federal district court in Pennsylvania in
2002.205 Both of these cases share similar reasoning and interpret the
same Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 06 Even though these cases would
not be mandatory precedent to another federal or state court deciding the
hypothetical plaintiffs case, and the holding of the Grammer case may
influence the court's analysis, the hypothetical plaintiff likely would not
be able to convince a court that § 1396r provides a remedy to match her
existing rights because there is no reason why the reasoning of the prior

203. Id. at 303.
204. Brogdon ex rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330-32
(N.D. Ga. 2000). The complaint alleged the existence of "inhumane conditions" at the
nursing home that violated various provisions of § 1396r and § 1395i-3. See id. at 132526.
205. Sparr v. Berks County, No. 02-2576, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *1-7
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002).
206. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-32; Sparr,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204,
at *2-7.
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courts is not still valid.207 The remainder of this analysis will briefly
examine how the reasoning of the Brogdon and Sparr courts likely
would lead to the dismissal of the hypothetical plaintiff s claim.
The hypothetical plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Congress
intended to imply a private cause of action under § 1396r.208 In Cort v.
Ash,209 the Supreme Court instructed that a plaintiff in this context must
convince the court (1) that the statute was created for the plaintiffs
especial benefit; (2) that there is evidence of legislative intent to create a
private remedy; (3) that a private remedy is consistent with the
legislative purposes of the statute; and (4) that the area is not one
traditionally relegated to state law. 2 10 In the end, the deciding court
should agree that "Congress intended to create the private remedy

asserted." 2 1 1
The court in Brogdon began its analysis of the Cort factors by
recognizing that the FNHRA likely were enacted for the benefit of a
class of beneficiaries including the plaintiffs.212 The court went so far as
to propose that the FNHRA "may confer federal rights."2 13 The Sparr
court agreed that the statute was enacted for the plaintiff without further
reasoning.2 14 Certainly now, after the Grammer court held that § 1396r
confers federal rights upon these types of plaintiffs,2 15 this element of the
Corttest is clearly in favor of finding an implied cause of action. Yet, as
the Brogdon court pointed out, just because the plaintiffs have rights
under a federal statute does not mean that Congress intended for the
rights to be enforceable.2 16
207. Despite the FNHRA legislation being passed, courts subsequently have decided
against similar plaintiffs. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 ("An examination of the
FNHRA does not alter this conclusion."). See also Prince v. Dicker, 29 F. App'x 52, 54
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Brogdon and holding no implied cause of action); Wheat v. Mass,
994 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding same); Andrusichen v. Extendicare Health
Servs., No. 02-674, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13818, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2002)
(dismissing complaint in accordance with Sparr); Tinder v. Lewis Cty. Nursing Home
Dist., 207 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956-58 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (holding that a resident has no
private right of action under § 1396r).
208. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1330 (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,

363-64 (1992)).
209. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
210. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1330 (citing Cort,422 U.S. at 78).
211. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16
(1979)).

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Sparr v. Berks County, No. 02-2576, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002) ("Clearly, Plaintiff is one for whom the statute was enacted.").
215. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'1 Ctrs. - Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 530 (3d
Cir. 2009).
216. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981)).
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The Brogdon court continued its analysis of the Cort factors by
searching for evidence of legislative intent to create a private remedy in
addition to the private right. " The court found that the legislative
history of the FNHRA did not support a finding that Congress intended
for an implied cause of action to exist.2 18 The court noted that OBRA, of
which the FNHRA are a part, is spending power legislation, which
traditionally involves a contract-like agreement between the recipients of
funds and Congress, to further congressional policy. 2 19 In the case of the
FNHRA, the court found that the contract-like exchange was evident in
excerpts from the House Reports, which indicated that Congress intended
to further its policies by attaching certain conditions to the funding that
would be enforced by CMS and state agencies. 220 Although the court
admitted that the statute explicitly states that any remedies provided for
should not be "construed as limiting [any] other remedies, including
[those] at common law,"22 1 it concluded that such language implied that
Congress did not consider authorizing a private cause of action under the
statute.222 The Sparr court reasoned in the same manner, only adding
that the length of Congress's discussion regarding the ternination
process of a noncomplying facility further indicates their intention to
leave private causes of action to the common law.223 The Brogdon court
completed its analysis of the second factor by noting that the Medicaid
Act was not modeled after a statute that contained an implied cause of
action, like Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,224 and
furthermore, that the Medicaid Act is not designed to prevent
discrimination.22 5
In response to these persuasive arguments, the hypothetical plaintiff
might contend that the Grammer court's analysis of the "rights-creating
language" in § 1396r is persuasive, as the court held that the language of

217. See id. at 1331-32.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 1331.
220. See id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 452, 471 (explaining that the
central purpose of the FNHRA is to improve residents' quality of life by bringing
substandard facilities into compliance through enforcement or excluding them from
funding)).
221. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396r(h)(8), 1395i-3(h)(5) (LexisNexis 2010)).
The House Report goes even further by stating that the common law remedies may
include "private rights of action to enforce compliance with requirements for nursing
facilities." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 472. This may suggest that Congress
considered a private right of action and declined to include it in the statute.
222. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
223. See Sparr v. Berks County, No. 02-2576, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002).
224. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
225. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
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§ 1396r "unambiguously" confers enforceable rights upon residents, like
the rights-creating language in Title IX and Title VI unambiguously
226
confers enforceable rights upon victims of discrimination.
Indeed,
when the Supreme Court discerned an implied cause of action under
Title IX, it found both a right and a remedy, allowing for a private cause
of action under federal law. 2 27 Nevertheless, a court can distinguish §
1396r from the civil rights statutes. In Grammer, the Third Circuit
considered only the existence of rights, and not the existence of a
remedy, because any right would presumptively be enforceable under §
1983.228 Although the two analyses are similar,229 they still involve
separate tests. 23 0 Thus, in sum, there simply is not enough evidence to
suggest that Congress intended § 1396r to be more than a spending
231
power statute that allows for § 1983 claims against state actors.
2 32
The third element of the Cort analysis was settled by the Brogdon
court in favor of an implied cause of action under § 1396r.233 Because of
Congress's intent to improve the residents' quality of care and the
explicit statutory recognition of common law remedies, the Brogdon
court found that a private remedy would be consistent with the legislative
Although the Sparr court agreed that Congress was
scheme.234
concerned with the quality of care in nursing homes, it argued that the
primary legislative purpose of the Medicaid Act is to direct the use of

226. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Ctrs. - Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 531 (3d Cir.
2009).
227. See generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 689-717 (1979).
228. See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 525 n.2.
229. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2001) ("[T]he initial
inquiry-determining whether a statute confers any right at all-is no different from the
initial inquiry in an implied right of action case. . . ." (citing California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))).
230. See id at 283 ("We have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be
enforced through § 1983 is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether
a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute." (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990))).
231. See Brogdon ex rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332
(N.D. Ga. 2000) (determining that § 1396r has nothing more than the "components of a
typical funding statute"). Additionally, there is no reason to suggest that Grammer's
finding of federal rights under § 1396r alters the analysis of Congress's intent to create a
private cause of action under the statute.
232. The Supreme Court has instructed that the third and fourth elements of the Cort
test should not be broached unless the first two elements suggest that Congress intends to
provide a private cause of action under the statute. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298
(citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574-76 (1979)). Even though the
Brogdon court does not address this aspect of the Cart analysis, I will apply all four
elements of the test because the first element is strongly in favor of an implied cause of
action and the Brogdon court considered all four elements of the test in its opinion.
233. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
234. Id.

2010]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER

§ 1396R

285

federal funds by states. 23 5 Consequently, the Sparr court concluded that
an implied cause of action would be inconsistent with the purposes of
§ 1396r.236 The court did not explain why an implied cause of action had
to be consistent with the primary purpose of the statute, nor did it explain
why improving the standard of care in nursing homes must be a
secondary purpose of § 1396r.237 Regardless, in the hypothetical
plaintiffs case, the Brogdon court's interpretation of the purposes of §
1396r is strengthened by Grammer's determination that residents have
rights under § 1396r. Logically, it would follow that if Congress implied
rights under a statute, it would be more likely to consider an implied
right of action concerning those rights as consistent with the statute.
Furthermore, the Grammer court specifically found that the terms of
§ 1396r "do not focus on the entity regulated rather than the individuals
protected," but on "the persons benefitted." 23 8 This finding is in direct
contradiction to the Sparr court's interpretation of § 1396r.239
Nevertheless, the impact of this reasoning on the final balancing of the
Cort test is likely insignificant because the Brogdon court already found
that this element was in favor of an implied cause of action.
The final element of the Cort analysis asks whether the implied
cause of action infringes upon an area of the law traditionally relegated
to the states, such that it would be "inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law." 240 Citing City ofBoerne v. Flores,241
which remarked that states traditionally have the prerogative "and
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens,",2 42 the Brogdon court determined that health and welfare
legislation is indeed traditionally relegated to the states. 2 43 The Sparr
court fully agreed with Brogdon's analysis and conclusion.244 Although
it would not be difficult for the hypothetical plaintiff to argue against a
Supreme Court opinion's observation, it would be much more difficult to
contend that a federal implied cause of action would not conflict with the

235. See Sparr v. Berks County, No. 02-2576, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002) (citing Chalfin v. Beverly Enters., 741 F. Supp. 1162, 1167
(E.D. Pa. 1989)).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'1 Ctrs. - Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 529-30 (3d
Cir. 2009).
239. See supra notes 235-237 and accompanying text.
240. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
241. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
242. Id. at 534.
243. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
244. See Sparr v. Berks County, No. 02-2576, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *6-7
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002).
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authority of the state to promulgate common law causes of action.245
Indeed, that particular concern is likely what inspired the Supreme Court
to fashion the final element of the test to ask whether a cause of action is
appropriately educed based solely on federal law.246 The quintessential
example of a cause of action that is appropriately based solely on federal
law is a suit brought under Title IX for gender discrimination because
state law has not traditionally been responsible for protecting individuals
from discrimination. 247 Thus, it is likely that a future court would agree
that the analysis of the final element of the Cort test weighs against
finding an implied cause of action under § 1396r for the hypothetical
plaintiff.
After considering all of the elements of the Cort test, the Brogdon
and Sparr courts held that insufficient evidence existed to prove that
Congress intended to create a private cause of action that would allow a
resident like the hypothetical plaintiff to sue a privately-run nursing
home to enforce her rights under § 1396r.24 8 While the Grammer
holding does strengthen the hypothetical plaintiffs arguments that
§ 1396r was enacted for her especial benefit and that an implied cause of
action would be consistent with the legislative scheme, the assistance is
The
trivial compared to the potency of the remaining elements.
that
the
hypothetical plaintiff does not have enough evidence to prove
legislative history intended to confer a private remedy and create a
private cause of action. Furthermore, the fact that the health and welfare
of citizens has traditionally been the prerogative of the states creates a
gargantuan hurdle for the hypothetical plaintiff to overcome. Faced with
these seemingly insurmountable arguments, the hypothetical plaintiff
likely will reflect on the practicality of even raising them in court.
Ultimately, it becomes a value judgment, and playing a large role in the
hypothetical plaintiffs decision will be the fact that she does not need a
private cause of action under § 1396r to seek full redress for her injuries.
Indeed, various state law claims provide her with ample opportunities for
redress and § 1396r may be used to establish the standard of care in
negligence or third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims. 24 9 Thus,
although it is arguably in the best interests of the plaintiff to raise every
possible cause of action to maximize recovery, here, it is likely in the

245. For examples of state common law causes of action in this context, see supra
note 22.
246. See City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
247. See Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d. at 1332 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 708 (1979)).
248. See id.; Sparr,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, at *6-7.
249. See supra note 22; see also Brogdon, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-37 (denying
several motions to dismiss state law claims).
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best interests of the hypothetical plaintiff to focus her efforts on
appropriate state law claims and using § 1396r as the standard of care
where applicable.
IV. CONCLUSION

In a nursing home world supported by Medicaid and Medicare, forprofit chains continue to dominate the landscape while residents of both
privately-run and state-run nursing homes continue to suffer from
federally-unacceptable levels of care. As CMS and state agencies
continue to perform a role in the protection of these residents, so do the
courts. In Grammer, the Third Circuit continued to fulfill its role as a
protector by inferring -a cause of action under § 1396r for residents of
state-run nursing homes and reminding residents of privately-run nursing
homes that the federal government also considers them a protected class.
Although privately-run nursing homes almost certainly cannot be
considered state actors and a private cause of action for residents of such
homes under § 1396r is very difficult to infer, these resident-plaintiffs
should be content in knowing that they have many avenues for redress.
In the end, it is much more preferable to avoid stretching state action
jurisprudence and creating implied causes of action than it is to grant
worthy plaintiffs unnecessary relief. With luck, the Third Circuit's
recognition of resident rights under § 1396r will inspire nursing home
residents and their families to actively participate in elder care, holding
all facilities responsible for the care that they provide. If the Grammer
opinion invokes this type of response from nursing home residents,
Congress's intention to improve the quality of life in nursing homes will
be fulfilled.
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